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Switch, 6 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 47 (2010), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr
/v6-1/letizia.pdf.

INTRODUCTION
“How do you all like your first year of law school?” asked the
man with the perfectly groomed hair. The response from the students
at Chicago-Kent College of Law was mixed: some smiled, others
shrugged, and the rest were too mesmerized by the hair and shiny suit
to respond. “Well, I didn’t do so great in law school, but look at me
now; I’m the Governor of Illinois.”
Less than four months after that brief visit to Chicago-Kent, news
of the Governor’s arrest was splashed across headlines throughout
Illinois, the United States, and even the world: “Illinois Gov. Rod
Blagojevich arrested on federal charges.” 1
Not surprisingly, Blagojevich’s arrest, impeachment, and
subsequent removal from office—most notably for his attempt to sell
President Barack Obama’s vacated United States Senate seat—
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., 2008, Saint Louis University.
1
See, e.g., Jeff Coen, Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich Arrested on Federal
Charges, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.chicagotribune.com
/news/politics/obama/chi-blagojevich-1210,0,7494354.story; Illinois Governor
Arrested on Corruption Charges, EURONEWS (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.euronews
.net/2008/12/09/illinois-governor-arrested-on-corruption-charges/.
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garnered massive amounts of attention from the public and the media. 2
For those interested in following his downfall and subsequent
expulsion from public office, there was a nearly endless stream of
sources from which to obtain information, including online sources
such as blogs, 3 Twitter, 4 and Facebook. 5 Even those members of the
public who wished to avoid the media frenzy surrounding Rod
Blagojevich were hard-pressed to avoid daily updates; this was
especially true when Blagojevich’s federal trial date was announced. 6
Following the announcement of the trial date, the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois (Judge James B. Zagel presiding)
began to receive e-mails and letters from members of the general
public containing advice as to how he should rule. 7 In light of the
great public interest surrounding the trial, Judge Zagel stated in a
public status hearing that he had “given some consideration to public
anonymity of the jurors at [least] until the trial is over.” 8 Judge Zagel
considered deferring disclosure of the jurors’ names in order to prevent
members of the public from contacting the jurors. 9
On May 17, 2010, Judge Zagel held an informal and off-therecord meeting with members of the media to discuss his intention to
keep the names of the jurors anonymous until a verdict was

2

See, e.g., Ray Long, Impeached Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich Has Been
Removed From Office, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jan. 30, 2009),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-blagojevich-impeachmentremoval,0,5791846.story?page=2.
3
See, e.g., Natasha Korecki, THE BLAGO BLOG, http://blogs.suntimes.com/
blago/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
4
http://twitter.com/governorrod.
5
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Rod-Blagojevich/9367545725.
6
See Blagojevich Trial Date Set for June 3, 2010, FOX NEWS (June 25, 2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/06/25/blagojevich-trial-date-set-june/.
7
Brief and Short Appendix of Intervenor-Appellants at 6, United States v.
Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-2359).
8
Brief & Appendix of the United States at 4, United States v. Blagojevich, 612
F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-2359).
9
Id.
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rendered. 10 Two weeks after this meeting and two days before jury
selection was set to begin, The Chicago Tribune, The New York Times,
and three media groups (hereinafter “Press Intervenors”) filed a
motion to intervene and for immediate public access to the names of
jurors. 11 The Press Intervenors brought this motion in order to object
to an anonymous jury. 12 The Press Intervenors were interested in
publishing human-interest stories and determining whether the jurors
were “suitable decision-makers.” 13
Before holding a hearing on the Press Intervenors’ motion, Judge
Zagel assured the potential jurors that their names would not be
disclosed until the conclusion of the trial. 14 Judge Zagel then held a
hearing and denied the Press Intervenors’ motion on the basis that it
was untimely and there was “a legitimate reason for sealing the names
during trial.” 15 Judge Zagel anticipated “that the substantial attention
being devoted to the criminal charges against a former Governor of
Illinois would lead the press and public to bombard jurors with email
and instant messages that could undermine their impartiality (and
perhaps their equanimity).” 16 Further bolstering Judge Zagel’s
decision was the fear that public knowledge of the jurors’ identities
“would discourage others from agreeing to serve in future trials.” 17 It
is important to note, however, that the parties and their counsel would
be given access to the names of the jurors; Judge Zagel’s ruling related
only to the delayed release of the jurors’ names to the public. 18
10

Id. at *5.
Press Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene and for Immediate Public Access to
Names of Jurors at 1, United States v. Blagojevich, 2010 WL 2934476 (N.D. Ill. July
26, 2010) (No. 08 CR 888).
12
Id.
13
United States v. Blagojevich (Blagojevich I), 612 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir.
2010).
14
Brief & Appendix of the United States, supra note 8, at 8.
15
Brief and Short Appendix of Intervenor-Appellants, supra note 7, at 4–5.
16
Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 559.
17
Id. at 562.
18
Id. at 559.
11
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Determined to obtain the jurors’ names, the Press Intervenors
appealed to the Seventh Circuit, contending that the press has an
unqualified right of access to jurors’ names under the First
Amendment. 19 The Seventh Circuit did not agree that the press has an
unqualified right of access to the names; 20 instead, the court stated that
there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of disclosure of jurors’
names. 21 In its analysis of whether this presumption had been rebutted,
the Seventh Circuit explicitly refused to rely on the First Amendment;
instead, the court used statutes and the common law. 22 Importantly,
the First Amendment, common law, and statutory law each carries its
own distinct standard by which the presumption can be rebutted. 23
Notably, the First Amendment standard carries a more rigorous burden
for rebutting the presumption than the common law and statutory
standards. 24 However, instead of applying the common law and
statutory standards to its common law and statutory analysis, the
Seventh Circuit applied the more rigorous First Amendment standard
to its analysis. 25 Ultimately, the court held that the presumption in
favor of disclosure had not been rebutted. 26 The court vacated Judge
Zagel’s deferred-disclosure order and remanded the case with
instructions to grant the Motion to Intervene and hold proceedings
consistent with its opinion. 27
19

Id. at 561.
Id.
21
Id. at 563.
22
Id.
23
See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78 (statutory
standard); Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty. (Press-Enterprise
I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (First Amendment standard); Rushford v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (common law standard); United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Plan for Random Selection
of Jurors (Dec. 2006), http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/press/ILNDJuryPlan.pdf
(statutory standard).
24
See Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253.
25
Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 564.
26
Id. at 563.
27
Id.
20
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This Note considers whether the Seventh Circuit applied the
correct standard when it analyzed the issue of whether the jurors’
names should be kept from the public until verdict was rendered in
Blagojevich’s case. Part I of this Note provides a background as to
when jurors’ names can be withheld from the public. Part II provides a
background of the Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Blagojevich.
Part III argues that the panel incorrectly applied a First Amendment
standard to its common law and statutory analysis of whether the
jurors’ names should be kept secret, and thereby erased the distinction
among First Amendment, common law, and statutory analyses of this
issue in the Seventh Circuit. Finally, Part IV argues that this distinction
should be revived because if a court is unable to use the common law
standard—which carries a lower burden than the First Amendment
standard—in the future, it may result in the release of jurors’ names
when they otherwise would have been protected from the public and
the media.
I. PUBLIC ACCESS TO JURORS’ NAMES PRIOR TO VERDICT IS NOT AN
ABSOLUTE RIGHT
A. A Presumption of Openness
In the United States of America, “a presumption of openness
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of
justice.” 28 This presumption stems in part from the fact that “[o]ur
system of jurisprudence abhors the ancient star chamber inquisitions,”
in which accused Englishmen were subjected to secret trials and
deprived of their rights. 29 Consequently, the presumption of openness
extends to most aspects of a criminal trial, including the identities of
jurors. 30 This presumption of openness with regard to jurors’ identities
28

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
Commonwealth v. Swinehart, 664 A.2d 957, 967 (Pa. 1995).
30
Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 563. Presumption of openness also extends to:
voir dire, Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); preliminary hearings, PressEnter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal for Cnty. of Riverside (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S.
29
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stems from three distinct sources: (1) The First Amendment, (2)
common law, and (3) and statutory law.
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II),
the Supreme Court created the Experience and Logic Test 31 in order
“[t]o determine what aspects of a criminal trial are subject to a
presumptive right of public access under the First Amendment.” 32 The
Experience and Logic Test requires courts to evaluate two
complementary considerations to determine whether information is
subject to the right of access. 33 The “experience” prong is used to
determine “whether the place and process have historically been open
to the press and general public,” and the “logic” prong is used to
consider “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question.” 34 In United States v.
Wecht, the Third Circuit employed the Experience and Logic Test and
concluded that there is a presumptive First Amendment right of access
to jurors’ identities. 35 Notably, in United States v. Blagojevich, the
Seventh Circuit explicitly refused to rely “on the [F]irst [A]mendment
as the means of obtaining the [juror] information.” 36 Instead, the
Seventh Circuit relied on the two other sources mentioned above: the
common law and statutes. 37
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., the Supreme Court
stated that there is a “common-law right of access to judicial
records.” 38 The “long-recognized presumption in favor of public
access to judicial records” gives the public the right “to monitor the
functioning of our courts, thereby insuring quality, honesty and respect
1 (1986); judicial records, Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978);
and the criminal trial itself, Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555.
31
478 U.S. at 9.
32
United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 234 (3d Cir. 2008).
33
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8.
34
Id.
35
537 F.3d at 239.
36
Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2010).
37
Id.
38
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
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for our legal system.” 39 This right of access includes a right to inspect
and copy both public and judicial records and documents. 40 This right
has also been extended to include the disclosure of juror names; for
example, in United States v. Blagojevich, the Seventh Circuit found
that the presumption in favor of disclosure of jurors’ names finds its
roots in the common-law tradition of open litigation. 41
In addition, the presumption in favor of disclosure of jurors’
names can stem from the Jury Selection and Service Act, which
provides that each plan for jury selection must “fix the time when the
names drawn from the qualified jury wheel shall be disclosed to the
parties and to the public.” 42 As acknowledged by the Seventh Circuit,
“[t]he answers ‘never’ or ‘after trial’ are possible under this language
but constitute an exception to the norm of disclosure, an exception that
needs justification.” 43
Importantly, the presumption that jurors’ names will be disclosed
under any one of these three sources is not absolute. 44 Each source
carries its own distinct standard by which the presumption of openness
can be rebutted. 45
1. First Amendment Standard
A district court can attempt to rebut the presumption in favor of
disclosure using a First Amendment standard. The controlling standard
39

In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984).
Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597.
41
Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 563.
42
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (emphasis
added).
43
Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 563.
44
Id. at 561.
45
See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78 (statutory
standard); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (First Amendment standard);
Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988)
(common law standard); United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Plan for Random Selection of Jurors (Dec. 2006),
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/press/ILNDJuryPlan.pdf (statutory standard).
40
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is found in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise
I), a case in which the Supreme Court found that the First Amendment
makes the jury selection process presumptively open to the public. 46
As stated in Press-Enterprise I, under the First Amendment:
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential
to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with
findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine
whether the closure order was properly entered. 47
The Supreme Court reiterated this standard in Waller v. Georgia,
where the Court held that the closure of a suppression hearing over the
objections of the accused must meet the standards set out in PressEnterprise I:
Under Press-Enterprise, the party seeking to close the
hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to
be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary
to protect that interest, the trial court must consider
reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must
make findings adequate to support the closure. 48
The First Amendment standard was also applied in the context of
juror name disclosure in United States v. Wecht. 49 In Wecht, the Third
Circuit held that there is a presumptive First Amendment right of
access to obtain the names of both trial jurors and prospective jurors

46

464 U.S. 501.
Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
48
467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984).
49
537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008).
47
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prior to empanelment of the jury, and that the district court failed to
rebut this presumption under the First Amendment standard. 50
2. Common Law Standard
Instead of using a First Amendment standard, a district court can
attempt to rebut the presumption in favor of disclosure via a common
law standard. As stated in Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., the
presumption of access “can be rebutted if countervailing interests
heavily outweigh the public interests in access.” 51 Additionally, the
trial court may weigh “the interests advanced by the parties in light of
the public interests and the duty of the courts.” 52
A comparison of the common law standard against the First
Amendment standard makes it clear that “[t]he common law does not
afford as much substantive protection to the interests of the press and
the public as does the First Amendment.” 53 While the common law
simply calls for “countervailing interests,” 54 the First Amendment
requires an “overriding interest.” 55 Furthermore, while the First
Amendment requires that closure be “narrowly tailored,” 56 the
common law only requires a weighing of countervailing interests to
determine if they heavily outweigh the presumption of access. 57
The ability of a court to rebut this presumption under the common
law finds its roots in the court’s inherent power to control the
proceedings in front of it. 58 This implied judicial power is “governed
50

Id. at 240 (finding that the district court’s reasons for rebutting the
presumption were “conclusory and generic” and lacked the specificity required by
the First Amendment standard).
51
Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988)
(emphasis added).
52
Id. (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
56
Id.
57
Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253.
58
See generally Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
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not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases.” 59 According to Ballentine’s Law Dictionary,
“inherent power” is defined as:
A power essential to the very existence of the court or its
ability to function in dispensing justice . . . A power included
within the scope of a court’s jurisdiction which a court
possesses irrespective of specific grant by constitution or
legislation; a power which can neither be taken away nor
abridged by the legislature. 60
In the context of disclosure of juror names, some courts have
concluded that a trial court’s inherent power to control courtroom
proceedings includes the power to control the release of juror names. 61
In Gannet Co. v. State, the court stated: “Indeed other courts have
noted that the theory of the jury at common law supports an historical
tradition of judicial discretion as to disclosure of juror names.” 62
Similarly, Judge Posner argued in his dissent from the denial of
rehearing en banc of United States v. Blagojevich that the question of
whether to release juror names “call[s] for an exercise of judgment” on
the part of the trial judge, based on the judge’s experience and
common sense. 63
Furthermore, in the context of high-publicity cases, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged the right of a trial court to manage the
courtroom and courthouse premises, and even restrict the release of
information by counsel, witnesses, newspeople, and court staff. 64 In
Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court recognized the
59

Id. at 43.
BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).
61
Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 746 (Del. 1989).
62
Id.
63
United States v. Blagojevich (Blagojevich II), 614 F.3d 287, 290 (7th Cir.
2010) (Posner, J., dissenting).
64
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
60

56
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“pervasiveness of modern communications” and the potentially
prejudicial impact that it can have on jurors. 65 In light of this fact, the
court stated that trial judges must use their power to “ensure that the
balance is never weighed against the accused.” 66 The court further
advised that “the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent
the prejudice at its inception”; 67 one such remedial measure is
deferring disclosure of jurors’ names before trial because it cuts off the
possibility of prejudicial impact.
3. Statutory Standard
Instead of using the First Amendment or the common law, a
district court can also attempt to rebut the presumption in favor of
disclosure by using a statutory standard. The Jury Selection and
Service Act provides express statutory authority to abridge the
presumption in favor of disclosure “if the interests of justice so
require.” 68
The Jury Selection and Service Act requires each district court to
adopt a jury-selection plan, which must:
[F]ix the time when the names drawn from the qualified jury
wheel shall be disclosed to parties and to the public. If the
plan permits these names to be made public, it may
nevertheless permit the chief judge of the district court, or
such other district court judge as the plan may provide, to
keep these names confidential in any case where the interests
of justice so require. 69

65

Id. at 362.
Id.
67
Id. at 363.
68
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78; see United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Plan for Random Selection
of Jurors (Dec. 2006), http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/press/ILNDJuryPlan.pdf.
69
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) (emphasis added).
66

57
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This section of the Act—particularly the sentence on “the interests
of justice”—gives district courts discretion to overcome the
presumption of openness and withhold juror names from the public.70
According to the Act’s legislative history, the Act “permits the present
diversity of practice to continue. Some district courts keep juror names
confidential for fear of jury tampering. Other district courts routinely
publicize the names.” 71 If a trial court withholds juror information
under the Jury Selection and Service Act, a showing of arbitrariness is
required to reverse the decision. 72
In addition, the Jury Selection and Service Plan adopted by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois states
that:
No person shall make public or disclose to any person, unless
so ordered by a judge of this Court, the names drawn from
the Qualified Jury Wheel to serve in this Court until the first
day of the jurors’ term of service. Any judge of this Court may
order that the names of jurors involved in a trial presided
over by that judge remain confidential if the interests of
justice so require. 73
This plan, like the Jury Selection and Service Act, provides that a
judge may keep juror names confidential “if the interests of justice so
require.” 74 Relying on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Nixon v.
Warner Communications that “the decision as to access is one best left
to the sound discretion of the trial court,” Judge Posner argued that the

70

United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d 287, 297 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing H.R. REP. No.
1076, at 11 (1968)).
72
United States v. Tucker, 526 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1976).
73
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Plan for
Random Selection of Jurors (Dec. 2006), http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/press/
ILNDJuryPlan.pdf (emphasis added).
74
Id.
71

58
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plan does not require the judge to hold a hearing to determine whether
the names of jurors shall remain confidential. 75
4. Anonymity, Deferred-Disclosure, Sequestration, Special Instruction
If a court is successful in overcoming the presumption of
openness using one of the three standards above, the court can then
use an anonymous jury, 76 deferred-disclosure, 77 sequestration, or
special instruction to keep the jurors’ names from the public. 78
When a judge decides to withhold indentifying information
regarding jurors—particularly their names—the jury is considered an
“anonymous jury.” 79 With a full-fledged anonymous jury, the jurors’
names will never be revealed to the public; on the other hand, when a
judge decides to temporarily withhold the names of the jurors, the term
used is “deferred-disclosure.” 80
As an alternative to anonymity or deferred-disclosure, a judge can
make a special instruction to the jury to prevent any risks associated
with disclosure. 81 For example, a judge can “instruct jurors not to
answer calls, listen to voice mails, or open e-mails and letters from
numbers and addresses they do not recognize.” 82 Finally, the most
extreme option for keeping jurors out of the public eye is called
“sequestration”; if a judge sequesters a jury, the jurors will be isolated
from members of the general public during trial. 83

75

Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d at 297 (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc.,
435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978)).
76
See United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1217 (7th Cir. 1992).
77
See United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
78
United States v. Blagojevich (Blagojevich III), No. 08 CR 888-1, 6, 2010
WL 2934476, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2010).
79
United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1215 (7th Cir. 1992).
80
United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
81
Blagojevich III, 2010 WL 2934476, at *9.
82
Id.
83
Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 2010).
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5. Reasons for Restricting Access to Jurors’ Names
In most cases, the parties and the public know the names and
other identifying information of jurors. 84 However, in certain criminal
trials, “special precautions must be taken in order to protect jurors
from harassment, intimidation, anxiety, and a host of other disruptive
influences.” 85 Indeed, as stated in United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez,
[S]ome combination of the following factors may support the
empanelment of an anonymous jury: (1) the defendant’s
involvement in organized crime, (2) the defendant’s
participation in a group with the capacity to harm jurors, (3)
the defendant’s past attempts to interfere with the judicial
process, (4) the potential that, if convicted, the defendant will
suffer a lengthy incarceration and substantial monetary
penalties, and (5) extensive publicity that could enhance the
possibility that jurors’ names would become public and
expose them to intimidation and harassment. 86
In Ochoa-Vasquez, the court held that all five factors were
present. 87 The defendant was linked “to an organized criminal
organization with a history of violence and obstruction of justice,” he
faced a lengthy sentence if convicted, and “his prior connections to [a
Colombian drug] cartel promised to make [it] a high-profile trial.” 88
While the use of an anonymous jury typically arises in an organized
crime trial like Ochoa-Vasquez, where juror safety or intimidation is a
primary concern, it can also be useful in the context of high-profile
cases. 89

84

United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1215 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1215 n.10.
86
428 F.3d 1015, 1034 (11th Cir. 2005).
87
Id. at 1034.
88
Id. at 1034–35.
89
See United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir. 2002).
85
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For instance, Sheppard v. Maxwell was a high-profile case in
which the defendant was a young doctor who was accused of
bludgeoning his pregnant wife to death. 90 The trial attracted a
“swarm” of reporters, photographers, and television and radio
personnel, 91 leading the Supreme Court to comment that the publicity
created a “carnival atmosphere.” 92 In Sheppard, the Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether the defendant “was deprived of a
fair trial . . . because of the trial judge’s failure to protect [him]
sufficiently from the massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity that
attended his prosecution.” 93 In answering this question in the
affirmative, the Supreme Court was concerned not only with the
defendant’s due process rights, but with the jurors’ privacy rights as
well. 94 The Court stated:
Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an
impartial jury free from outside influences. Given the
pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty
of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors,
the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the
balance is never weighed against the accused. 95
Due to advances in technology, the pervasiveness of modern
communications that the Supreme Court was concerned about when
Sheppard was decided in 1966 has only increased since that time. 96 As
a result, some courts have taken strong measures, including the

90

384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966).
Id. at 339.
92
Id. at 357.
93
Id. at 335.
94
Id. at 353–62.
95
Id. at 362.
96
See id.
91
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empanelment of anonymous juries or deferred disclosure of jurors’
names in high-profile cases. 97
As noted above, in Sheppard, the Supreme Court was also
concerned with protecting the jurors’ privacy interests:
[T]he jurors were thrust into the role of celebrities by the
judge’s failure to insulate them from reporters and
photographers. The numerous pictures of the jurors, with
their addresses, which appeared in the newspapers before and
during the trial itself exposed them to expressions of opinion
from both cranks and friends. The fact that anonymous letters
had been received by prospective jurors should have made
the judge aware that this publicity seriously threatened the
jurors’ privacy. 98
A judge can protect jurors’ privacy interests from this type of publicity
in high-profile trials by restricting access to the jurors’ names and
other identifying information. 99 Without access to the jurors’ names,
the press will have a more difficult time “transform[ing] jurors’
personal lives into public news.” 100
Support for the notion that some high-profile cases warrant
restricting access to jurors’ names can also be found in United States v.
Edwards, decided by the Fifth Circuit in 2002. 101 Edwards is
strikingly similar to the Blagojevich case: one of the defendants, a
former Governor of the State of Louisiana, was convicted of
exploiting his apparent ability to influence Louisiana’s riverboat
gambling license process. 102 The governor’s trial attracted intense
97

See United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Gannett Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735
(Del. 1989).
98
Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 353 (citations omitted).
99
See Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618.
100
Id. at 630.
101
See 303 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2002).
102
Id. at 610.
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media interest, involved a defendant who was a polarizing figure in
Louisiana politics, and generated “highly charged emotional and
political fervor.” 103 While acknowledging that restricting access to
juror information typically occurs in organized crime trials, the Fifth
Circuit stated that this measure may be appropriate in a case that
“attracts unusually large media attention and arouses deep passions in
the community.” 104 The Fifth Circuit thus held that the district court’s
decision to withhold juror information was appropriate in this highprofile case. 105
II. UNITED STATES V. BLAGOJEVICH
A. Factual Background
Former Governor Rod Blagojevich was arrested on federal
corruption charges on December 9, 2008. 106 The charges alleged that
he conspired to sell President Barack Obama’s vacated United States
Senate seat, engaged in “pay-to-play” schemes, and misused state
funding to fire Chicago Tribune editorial writers. 107
The Illinois House of Representatives impeached Blagojevich by
a 114–1 vote on January 8, 2009. 108 This was the first time in Illinois’
“190-year history that a governor has been impeached.” 109 In late

103

Id. at 614.
Id. at 613.
105
Id. at 617.
106
Illinois Gov. Rod R. Blagojevich and His Chief of Staff John Harris
Arrested on Federal Corruption Charges, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PRESS RELEASE
(Dec. 9, 2008), http://chicago.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel08/dec09_08.htm.
107
Id.
108
Ray Long & Rick Pearson, House Votes to Impeach Blagojevich, THE
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jan. 9, 2009), http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/
2009/01/live-blog-of-il.html.
109
Id.
104
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January, 2009, Blagojevich went on a media blitz proclaiming his
innocence, going so far as to schedule eleven interviews in one day. 110
On January 29, 2009, the Illinois Senate removed Blagojevich from
office by a 59–0 vote, convicting him on an article of impeachment. 111
The Senate also voted 59–0 to bar Blagojevich from ever holding
public office again in the State of Illinois. 112
United States district Judge James Zagel set a trial date for June 3,
2010. 113 While Blagojevich was ultimately convicted by a federal jury
on one count of lying to the FBI, his conviction is not the focus of this
Note. 114 Instead, this Note will focus on the events leading up to the
start of Blagojevich’s federal trial—specifically, the hearings and
meetings held by Judge Zagel relating to the issue of disclosure of the
names of the jurors who would ultimately decide Blagojevich’s fate.
B. Press Intervenors’ Argument
On June 1, 2010, the Press Intervenors moved to intervene and for
immediate public access to the names of the jurors. 115 The Press
Intervenors made this motion for the limited purpose of objecting to an
110

Alex Koppelman, Rod Blagojevich Has Only Just Begun to Fight, THE
SALON (Jan 27, 2009), http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2009/01/27/
blago/index.html.
111
Malcolm Gay & Susan Saulny, Blagojevich Ousted by Illinois State Senate,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/30
illinois.html.
112
Id.
113
Jeff Coen, Corruption Trial for Blagojevich Set for June 3, 2010, CHICAGO
BREAKING NEWS CENTER (June 25, 2009), http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/
2009/06/corruption-trial-for-blagojevich-set-for-june-3.html.
114
Jeff Coen, John Chase, Bob Secter, Stacy St. Clair & Kristen Mack, Guilty
on Just 1 Count, Blago Taunts U.S. Attorney, CHICAGO BREAKING NEWS CENTER
(Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2010/08/14th-day-forblagojevich-jury.html. The jury deadlocked on the other twenty-three counts against
Blagojevich, and a mistrial was ordered on those counts. Id. A new trial is set to take
place 2011 on those remaining counts. Id.
115
Press Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene and for Immediate Public Access to
Names of Jurors, supra note 11, at 1.
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anonymous jury and seeking immediate public access to the jurors’
names. 116 In their motion, the Press Intervenors argued that there was
no valid reason to keep the jurors’ names anonymous and that sealing
the names would be contrary to the tradition of open trials and right of
access guaranteed by the First Amendment and the common law. 117
The Press Intervenors argued that juror names are presumptively
open to the public absent extraordinary circumstances and that this
presumption of access is mandated by both the First Amendment and
common law. 118 In support of their argument, the Press Intervenors
reasoned that “[k]nowledge of juror identities allows the public to
verify the impartiality of key participants in the administration of
justice.” 119 The Press Intervenors also argued that Judge Zagel’s
concern—“that revealing jurors’ names in a high-profile case would
tempt ‘bloggers’ to contact them during trial”—could be eliminated by
the tools that the court has at its disposal. 120
The Press Intervenors then argued that the Experience and Logic
Test from Press-Enterprises II confirms that the constitutional right of
access has specific application to juror names. 121 Analyzing the
“experience” prong, the Press Intervenors cited three cases suggesting
that there has been a well-established tradition of access to juror
names. 122 Analyzing the “logic” prong, the Press Intervenors cited
three additional cases suggesting that public access to juror names
“plays a significant and positive role” because it allows the public to
verify the impartiality of jurors and educates the public on the judicial
system. 123
116

Id.
Id. at 2.
118
Memorandum in Support of Press Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene and for
Immediate Public Access to Names of Jurors at 1, United States v. Blagojevich,
2010 WL 2934476 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (No. 08 CR 888).
119
Id. at 2 (citing United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008)).
120
Id.
121
Id. at 4.
122
Id. at 5.
123
Id. at 6 (citing In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1990)).
117
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The Press Intervenors then argued that, in Blagojevich’s case,
there was no justification for an anonymous jury that could overcome
the constitutional presumption of openness. 124 The Press Intervenors
argued that the presumption had not been overcome because neither
the court nor the parties had shown “any threats, jury tampering or
‘other evils affecting the administration of justice’ that justify
withholding jurors’ identities from the media.” 125 Rather, the Press
Intervenors argued that the “heavy, First Amendment-freighted burden
cannot be sustained by a generalized belief that it would be better for
jurors to remain anonymous, lest they be beset by bloggers.” 126
Finally, the Press Intervenors attached an affidavit of Matt
O’Connor, a Chicago Tribune editor, in support of their motion. In the
affidavit, Matt O’Connor stated that based on his personal experience
and research there is a tradition of openness in the jury selection
process which includes public access to the jurors’ names in high
profile cases. 127 While stating that the rare exceptions to public access
typically involve cases where jury safety is at issue, he acknowledged
that there have also been “notable exceptions” in high-profile cases
such as the trial of Conrad Black. 128
C. District Court’s Hearing on Press Intervenors’ Motion
On June 3, 2010, Judge Zagel held a hearing on the Press
Intervenors’ motion. 129 The motion was denied for the reasons stated
124

Id. at 8.
Id.
126
Id. at 10.
127
Affidavit of Matt O’Connor in Support of Motion to Intervene and for
Immediate Public Access to Names of Jurors at 2, United States v. Blagojevich,
2010 WL 2934476 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (No. 08 CR 888).
128
Id. at 3; see United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 620 (N.D. Ill.
2007) (denying motion to disclose final jury list for the case of Conrad Black, a
Canadian businessman whose trial for fraud “generated intense international media
interest”).
129
Notification of Docket Entry at 1, United States v. Cellini (N.D. Ill. June 3,
2010) (No. 08 CR 888).
125
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in open court. 130 Displeased with Judge Zagel’s denial of their motion,
the Press Intervenors appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit. 131 However, before analyzing the appeal, it is
important to understand why Judge Zagel denied the Press
Intervenors’ motion; a portion of Judge Zagel’s reasoning is revealed
in the Press Intervenors’ appellate brief. 132
As described in the Press Intervenors’ appellate brief, Judge Zagel
began the hearing by addressing the timeliness of the Press
Intervenors’ motion to intervene. Judge Zagel stated that the Press
Intervenors’ motion was “untimely” and should have been filed much
earlier. 133 Importantly, Judge Zagel ruled that even if the Press
Intervenors’ motion were timely, he would still deny the motion on the
merits, because he “concluded that there was a legitimate reason for
sealing the names during trial.” 134
Judge Zagel stated that the Blagojevich case was “different”
because it had attracted “enormous public attention, an enormous
expression of views.” 135 Judge Zagel was also concerned about
improper contact with jurors by “bloggers” and others via the Internet:
“[I]t strikes me that there has been extraordinary attention paid to this
case, that [leads] not only to the expression of opinions, but to people
seeing an opportunity to get noticed, and one way to get yourself
noticed is to do something in connection with this particular case.” 136
Judge Zagel was also concerned with the fact that members of the
public can use e-mail to communicate secretly with jurors, and stated
that this must be avoided. 137
Importantly, the Press Intervenors acknowledged that Judge
Zagel’s concerns were not merely hypothetical because he had
130

Id.
Brief and Short Appendix of Intervenor-Appellants, supra note 7, at 1.
132
See id. at 4–6.
133
Id. at 4.
134
Id. at 4–5.
135
Id. at 5.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 5–6.
131
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received e-mails and letters from members of the public containing
advice as to how he should rule. 138 Furthermore, although the Press
Intervenors argued that Judge Zagel rejected out of hand the
alternatives to juror anonymity that they suggested, they
acknowledged that Judge Zagel thought it would be unfair to prohibit
members of the jury from reading unsolicited e-mails. 139
D. Government’s Argument
The Government provided two arguments in its appellate brief.
First, the Government argued that it was not an abuse of discretion to
deem the motion to intervene untimely. 140 The Government noted that
a full year before trial, the Press Intervenors were on notice that Judge
Zagel was considering deferring disclosure of juror names. 141 Instead
of intervening then, the Press Intervenors waited “until the eve of
trial.” 142 Furthermore, once Judge Zagel definitively decided to defer
disclosure, the Press Intervenors waited two weeks to move to
intervene, and noticed their motion for hearing “on the very day jury
selection was set to begin.” 143 The Government argued that the
“appellants’ delays deprived the district court and the parties of an
opportunity for due deliberation,” which justified Judge Zagel’s
decision to deny the Press Intervenors’ motion. 144 Further bolstering
the Government’s argument was the fact that Judge Zagel already told
the jurors that they would not be identified by name. 145
Second, the Government argued that it was not an abuse of
discretion for Judge Zagel to defer disclosure of the jurors’ names to

138

Id. at 6.
Id.
140
Brief & Appendix of the United States, supra note 8, at 12.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 8.
139
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the public until verdict. 146 The Government argued that the Press
Intervenors “failed to establish that access to juror names prior to
verdict is a right guaranteed to them by the First Amendment or the
common law, rather than a matter of discretion traditionally and
appropriately vested in the district court.” 147 The Government argued
that even if a qualified right to juror names prior to verdict exists, the
circumstances of this case—including the “unprecedented” amount of
public attention and substantial risk that “seated jurors would become
the targets of unsolicited, and presumptively prejudicial, contacts”—
warranted deferred disclosure. 148
Like the Press Intervenors, the Government embarked on an
analysis of the Experience and Logic Test to determine if the First
Amendment provides a qualified right of access to juror names. 149
Based on an analysis of statutes and case law, the Government
concluded that it did not. 150 The Government concluded by requesting
that the Seventh Circuit affirm Judge Zagel’s denial of the Press
Intervenors’ motion to intervene. 151
E. The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion
Chief Judge Easterbrook wrote the Seventh Circuit opinion, which
was issued on July 2, 2010. 152 That same day, a member of the court
asked for a vote on whether to rehear the case en banc. 153 “After the
146

Id. at 13.
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 19.
150
Id. at 20.
151
Id. at 40. In their reply brief, the Press Intervenors criticized the
Government’s brief as “reflect[ing] a cramped conception of the press’s and public’s
right of access to criminal proceedings that is fundamentally at odds with the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.” Reply Brief of IntervenorAppellants at 1, United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 102359).
152
Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d 558, 558 (7th Cir. 2010).
153
Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d 287, 287 (7th Cir. 2010).
147
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judges exchanged comments, but before the voting on whether to grant
rehearing en banc was complete, the panel decided to alter its opinion
to meet some of the concerns expressed in the exchange of
comments.” 154 Ultimately, a majority of the judges voted against
hearing the appeal en banc. 155
On July 12, 2010, the panel issued its amended opinion, 156 which
is the subject of this section. In the amended opinion, the Seventh
Circuit held that the motion to intervene was timely 157 and that the
presumption in favor of disclosure of jurors’ names had not been
rebutted. 158 The Seventh Circuit vacated Judge Zagel’s deferreddisclosure order and remanded the case with instructions to grant the
motion to intervene and hold proceedings consistent with its
opinion. 159
The panel began by addressing the timeliness of the motion to
intervene and concluded that it was an abuse of discretion to deem the
motion untimely. 160 While the panel acknowledged that Judge Zagel
had assured the jurors that their names would not be revealed during
trial, the panel correctly stated that this assurance occurred after the
motion to intervene had been filed. 161 As a result, the court refused to
make Judge Zagel’s “declaration a self-fulfilling prophecy.” 162 The
panel acknowledged that the Press Intervenors were adequately
notified that Judge Zagel was considering deferred-disclosure of juror
names in mid-2009, and that they had to recognize that it was a
possibility in this case because “[t]wo years earlier a district judge had
deferred the release of jurors’ names in another high-profile criminal

154

Id. at 288 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id. at 287 (majority opinion).
156
Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 561 (7th Cir. 2010).
157
Id.
158
Id. at 563.
159
Id. at 565.
160
Id. at 560.
161
See id.
162
Id.
155
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prosecution in the Northern District of Illinois.” 163 However, the panel
stated that Judge Zagel likely would have rejected a motion to
intervene in mid-2009 as “premature.” 164 The panel ultimately held
that the Press Intervenors’ motion to intervene was not untimely as
“[t]here was never a public announcement identifying an issue and
specifying a schedule for its resolution.” 165
The panel then proceeded to address the merits of the appeal. The
panel rejected the Press Intervenors’ contention that the press has an
unqualified right of access to jurors’ names during trial, stating that
“no one contends (or should contend) that jurors’ names always must
be released.” 166 Rather, the panel was concerned with the justification
behind a judge’s decision to defer release of jurors’ names—or to not
release them at all. 167 The panel acknowledged that Judge Zagel had a
legitimate interest in deferring disclosure and that the Press
Intervenors had a legitimate interest in requesting that the names be
released. 168
Although the panel accepted that both sides had legitimate
interests in this matter, it refused to analyze the matter through the lens
of the First Amendment, as the Press Intervenors and Government had
in their briefs. 169 The court gave three main reasons for this refusal:
(1) “there is no general constitutional ‘right of access’ to information
that a governmental official knows but has not released to the
public,” 170 (2) the jurors’ names were not revealed during voir dire
“not because of the judge’s decision but because of § 10(a) of the
district court’s plan for implementing the Jury Selection and Service

163

Id. (citing United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625 (N.D. Ill.

2007)).
164

Id. at 560–61.
Id. at 561.
166
Id. (emphasis in original).
167
Id.
168
Id. at 562.
169
Id. at 563
170
Id. at 562.
165
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Act,” 171 and (3) “[a] court should never begin with the
Constitution.” 172 Rather than use the First Amendment, the panel
analyzed this matter via statutes and the common law, arguing that the
public has a common-law right of access to information that affects
the resolution of federal suits. 173
The panel derived a presumption in favor of disclosure of juror
names from both the common law tradition of open litigation and the
Jury Selection and Service Act. 174 The panel also provided a standard
for rebutting this presumption, which was stated in the opinion as
follows:
[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure
must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the
trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the
proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support
the closure. 175
The panel determined that under this standard, the presumption in
favor of disclosure of jurors’ names had not been overcome because
Judge Zagel did not make any findings of fact and did not provide an
opportunity to present evidence. 176 Furthermore, the panel argued that
this presumption was not rebutted because “no evidence was taken, no
argument entertained, no alternatives considered, and no findings
made before this decision was announced to the jurors.”177 The panel
also analyzed the language of the Jury Selection and Service Act and
the jury plan adopted by the Northern District of Illinois, and asserted
171

Id. at 562–63.
Id. at 563.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 563–64; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78 (2006).
175
Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 564 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48
(1984)).
176
Id. at 563.
177
Id. at 564.
172

72
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/3

26

Letizia: <em>United States v. Blagojevich</em>: A Standard Bait and Switch

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

that any exceptions to the norm of disclosure required “justification”
and “some procedure to make the necessary finding.” 178
Notably, however, the panel stated that the justification required
for deferred disclosure of juror names is less than the justification
required for empanelling an anonymous jury. 179 Furthermore, the
panel determined that the evidence a judge must consider “depends on
what the parties submit.” 180 Indeed, the panel cited to United States v.
Black, in which the parties presented no evidence, and the court
decided whether the jurors’ names should be disclosed based on “the
parties’ arguments and the judge’s experience with jurors’ concerns
and behavior.” 181 In comparison, the court stated that Judge Zagel “has
referred elliptically to efforts to contact him by email and in other
ways” and suggested that Judge Zagel put details on the record to help
demonstrate some of the potential effects of releasing the jurors’
names. 182
Ultimately, the court stated that “[w]hat is essential—what
occurred in Black but not so far in this case—is an opportunity for the
parties (including the intervenors) to make their views known in detail,
followed by a considered decision that includes an explanation why
alternatives to delayed release of the jurors’ names would be
unsatisfactory.” 183 Rather than deciding outright when it is appropriate
to delay the release of jurors’ names, the Seventh Circuit required a
new, and more complete, hearing. 184 The court remanded the case with
instructions to grant the motion to intervene and to hold a hearing
consistent with its opinion. 185

178

Id.
Id.
180
Id. at 565.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
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Id.
179
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F. Judge Posner’s Dissent
Although Judge Posner’s dissent is from the denial of rehearing
en banc, the crux of his analysis focuses on Judge Easterbrook’s
opinion and Judge Zagel’s decision to defer disclosure of the jurors’
names. 186
Judge Posner began by endorsing Judge Zagel’s handling of this
matter: “An experienced trial judge made a reasonable determination
that the release of jurors’ names before the end of trial would expose
the jurors to the widespread mischief that is a daily if not hourly
occurrence on the Internet.” 187 Judge Posner reiterated the important
fact that the jury was not anonymous; rather, the parties knew the
jurors’ names, and the public would know them after the trial ended. 188
Judge Posner argued that in light of this fact, and “[g]iven the
extremely high profile of this case nationwide as well as in Illinois,
and the unusual attention-getting conduct of the principal defendant
and his wife, there is no good argument for releasing the jurors’ names
before the trial ends.” 189
Next, Judge Posner criticized the panel’s decision for not
recognizing how serious the repercussions could be if Judge Zagel
were forced to renege on his promise to defer release of juror
names. 190 Though the panel acknowledged that it would be
“regrettable to disappoint jurors’ legitimate expectations,” 191 it failed
to recognize that “jurors may well be upset, concerned for their
privacy, fearful of the prospect of harassment . . . and angry at having
been induced by false pretenses to agree to take months out of their
life to perform jury service.” 192
186

See generally Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d 287, 288–97 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner,
J., dissenting).
187
Id. at 287.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 287–88.
190
Id. at 288.
191
See Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 2010).
192
Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d at 288 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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Judge Posner then criticized the panel’s argument that, unlike the
parties in the Black case, the parties and intervenors here did not have
an opportunity “to make their views known in detail.” 193 Judge Posner
argued that the parties and intervenors had this opportunity, but failed
to present any evidence of consequence. 194 Indeed, he noted that Judge
Zagel, unlike Judge St. Eve in Black, “actually had a bit of trial-type
evidence before him,” which was the affidavit from The Chicago
Tribune editor. 195 Therefore, Judge Posner concluded that “the media
have submitted evidence, that evidence was before Judge Zagel when
he ruled, and the media do not argue that they were prevented from
submitting more evidence.” 196 He further argued that the media did
not submit additional evidence because of their belief that the First
Amendment gives them the right to the jurors’ names unless there are
threats made against the jurors. 197
Judge Posner also criticized the panel’s reliance on “trial-type”
evidence, stating “trial-type evidence is neither required for, nor likely
to be helpful in, the judge’s exercise of discretion to withhold jurors’
names from the public until the trial ends.” 198 Rather, Judge Posner
posited that a trial judge should decide whether to defer disclosure of
juror names based on experience, common sense, and judgment. 199
Next, Judge Posner argued that the jurors’ interest in their privacy
during a lengthy high-profile trial trumps the public’s interest in
learning the jurors’ identities prior to verdict. 200 Importantly, Judge
Posner did not have to address the parties’ interests because
Blagojevich did not object to Judge Zagel’s deferred-disclosure order,
and the Government’s interest was in line with the jurors’ interest.201
193

Id. at 290.
Id.
195
Id. at 294; see supra Part II.B. (describing affidavit in detail).
196
Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d at 294 (Posner, J., dissenting).
197
Id.
198
Id. at 290.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 292.
201
Id.
194
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Citing to a number of law review articles, Judge Posner presented a
number of benefits to juror anonymity; he also endorsed Judge St.
Eve’s approach in United States v. Black:
In a case like this that has garnered intense national and
international media attention, releasing juror names during
the pendency of trial threatens the integrity of the jurors’
ability to absorb the evidence and later to render a verdict
based only on that evidence. This is the case because
disclosure increases the risk of third-party contact by the
press or by non-parties who are monitoring these proceedings
through the vast media attention this case has gathered. 202
Judge Posner opined that because the prosecution of Rod
Blagojevich was of an even higher-profile than that of the defendant in
Black, Judge Zagel’s decision to defer disclosure should have been
upheld without a new hearing. 203 Judge Posner then argued that the
Press Intervenors’ decision not to ask for a hearing was a forfeiture
that the court neglected to enforce. 204 He noted that the Press
Intervenors did not ask for a hearing in their motion to intervene or in
their appellate briefs. 205 Rather, they simply asked for the jurors’
names in the district court, and asked that Judge Zagel be ordered to
release the names on appeal. 206
Finally, Judge Posner criticized the panel for “overrul[ing] Judge
St. Eve’s sensible ruling rejecting any presumption in favor of
disclosure of jurors’ names before verdict.” 207 Judge Posner was
critical of the grounds on which the panel overruled Judge St. Eve—
namely, the “common-law right of access by the public to information
202

Id. at 293 (citing United States v. Black, 483 F. Supp. 2d 618, 628 (N.D. Ill.

2007)).
203

Id. at 295.
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 296.
204
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that affects the resolution of federal suits.” 208 He rejected the notion
that access to juror names falls within a presumption in favor of public
access to judicial records based on the fact that jurors’ names are not
judicial records. 209 Furthermore, even assuming that there is a federal
common-law right of access to juror names, Judge Posner argued that
it has been supplanted by legislation—specifically, the Jury Selection
and Service Act and the jury plan for the Northern District of
Illinois. 210 Judge Posner argued that these two pieces of legislation
allowed Judge Zagel to use his discretion and withhold juror names
until verdict. 211
III. ANALYSIS
In United States v. Blagojevich, the Seventh Circuit recognized
three bases by which judicial proceeding information is made
available to the press and public: (1) the First Amendment right of
access, 212 (2) the common-law presumption of openness, 213 and (3)
the Jury Selection and Service Act. 214 While each of these bases
functions primarily to make information available to the press and
public, each basis also carries its own distinct standard by which the
presumption of openness can be rebutted.
Under the First Amendment, the presumption of openness can
only be rebutted by an “overriding interest” with closure “narrowly
tailored” to serve that interest. 215 Under the common law, the
presumption of openness can be rebutted if “countervailing interests”

208

Id.
Id.
210
Id. at 297; see supra Part I.A.
211
Blagojevich II, 614 F.3d at 297 (Posner, J., dissenting).
212
See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
213
See Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.
1988).
214
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78.
215
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510.
209
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heavily outweigh the public interests; 216 furthermore, the trial court
may weigh “the interests advanced by the parties in light of the public
interest and the duty of the courts.” 217 Notably, “[t]he common law
does not afford as much substantive protection to the interests of the
press and the public as does the First Amendment.” 218 Finally, under
the Jury Selection and Service Act, the presumption can be rebutted if
the “interests of justice so require.” 219
The Seventh Circuit recognized the aforementioned distinctions
and explicitly refused to use the First Amendment as a vehicle to
analyze whether the district court had overcome the presumption in
favor of disclosure of jurors’ names. 220 Instead, the panel decided to
use “statutes and the common law.” 221 However, the panel failed to
apply the appropriate standard when it analyzed the issue. 222 Rather
than applying the common law and statutory standards to its common
law and statutory analysis, the panel—without explanation or
announcement—incorrectly applied the heavier-burdened First
Amendment standard to its analysis. 223
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit, quoting Waller v. Georgia,
applied the following standard to orders providing for anonymity of
jurors:
[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure
must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the
trial court must consider reasonable alternative to closing the

216

Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253.
Id. (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)).
218
Id.
219
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7).
220
Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2010).
221
Id.
222
Id. at 564.
223
Id.
217
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proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support
the closure. 224
However, the Seventh Circuit did not quote the standard in full—
it failed to include two crucial words: “Under Press-Enterprise.” 225
The full quote from Waller v. Georgia reads as follows:
Under Press-Enterprise, the party seeking to close the
hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to
be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary
to protect that interest, the trial court must consider
reasonable alternative to closing the proceeding, and it must
make findings adequate to support the closure. 226
Inclusion of the words “Under Press-Enterprise” is crucial
because Press-Enterprise—as the Seventh Circuit explicitly
acknowledged at the outset of its opinion—is a First Amendment
case. 227 Without these words, it is not clear that a First Amendment
standard is being applied; with them, the truth is revealed.
Therefore, it is clear that although the Seventh Circuit recognized
a distinction among the First Amendment, common law, and statutory
law, it effectively erased the distinction by applying a First
Amendment standard to its analysis of statutory and common law. As a
result of this opinion, there is serious question as to whether the
distinction remains because the First Amendment standard is applied
regardless of the basis by which the issue is analyzed. This distinction
should be revived because if a court is unable to use the common law
standard—which carries a lower burden than the First Amendment
standard—in the future, it may result in the release of jurors’ names
224

Id. (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984)). The Seventh
Circuit stated that this standard was “also true of orders providing for the anonymity
of jurors.” Id.
225
See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.
226
Id.
227
See Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 561.
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when they otherwise would have been protected from the public and
the media. Finally, it is clear that the Seventh Circuit has broken ranks
by not maintaining the distinction among the First Amendment,
common law, and statutory law. Other circuits have retained the
aforementioned distinction, recognizing that a common law right of
access analysis is distinct from the constitutional analysis in various
contexts. 228
IV. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Blagojevich, District Judge James Zagel
recognized that the jurors’ names should not be disclosed until the
conclusion of the trial. 229 The Press Intervenors seeking access to
these names appealed to the Seventh Circuit, claiming that “the press
has an unqualified right of access to jurors’ names while the trial
proceeds.” 230 This claim was based principally on two First
Amendment cases, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, and United
States v. Wecht. 231
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit explicitly refused to analyze the
issue under the First Amendment, and instead decided to follow
common law and statutory law. 232 However, the panel incorrectly
228

See, e.g., United States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)
(retained distinction in context of juror name disclosure); San Jose Mercury News,
Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.-N.D. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (retained
distinction in context of access to report); United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806,
811 (10th Cir. 1997) (retained distinction in context of sealing court documents);
Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (retained
distinction in context of disclosure of discovery documents).
229
Brief and Short Appendix of Intervenor-Appellants, supra note 7, at 4–5.
230
Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 561.
231
Id.; see Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (concluding that the
First Amendment makes voir dire presumptively open to the public); United States
v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (extending this approach to jurors’
names even when not mentioned during voir dire).
232
Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 563. The Seventh Circuit made it clear that a
judge could not make a decision to defer disclosure of jurors’ names simply on the
basis of inherent judicial power. Id. at 564.

80
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/3

34

Letizia: <em>United States v. Blagojevich</em>: A Standard Bait and Switch

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

applied a First Amendment standard to its common law and statutory
analysis. Furthermore, the panel did so without stating that the genesis
of the standard was First Amendment case law.
In its opinion, the panel established a distinction among First
Amendment, 233 common law, 234 and statutory 235 analyses of rebutting
the presumption of openness. However, the panel eliminated this
distinction by applying a First Amendment standard to its common law
and statutory analysis of whether jurors’ names should be disclosed. 236
The panel incorrectly erased this historic distinction and thus created a
significant risk for the future; it is now possible that a court will be
unable to apply a common law standard, which may result in the
improper release of jurors’ names. 237

233
234

See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510.
See Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.

1988).
235

See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–78.
See Blagojevich I, 612 F.3d at 564.
237
Id. Ultimately, on remand, Judge Zagel made the correct decision to defer
disclosure of jurors’ names until the end of trial. See Blagojevich III, No. 08 CR 8881, 6, 2010 WL 2934476, at *11 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2010) However, he applied the
wrong standard from the Seventh Circuit. See id. at *5.
236
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